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1. Can assets be put in a hierarchy, so that filing cabinets can be seen as part of an office building, or firewall as part of a server? I think this would have benefits for overview and determining potentially assets affected by incidents related to other assets below or above in the hierarchy. I'm not sure whether this makes sense from a Risk Management perspective.
While this functionality would be interesting, it is not currently available in Conformio because it is not required by the standard (even the guidelines from ISO 27002 for ISO 27001 Annex A control A.8.1.1 Inventory of assets do not mention this), and the building of such hierarchy would mean a whole module by itself (it is a whole discipline of ITIL and ISO 20000 - Service Asset and Configuration Management).
For further information, see:
2. I see the same vulnerabilities for different assets, like inadequate change control for laws, regulations, etc but also for policies, procedures and work instructions. Is there a way to optimize this and to reduce the number of vulnerabilities?
Please note that a single vulnerability may impact different assets like in the example you provided, but it is not mandatory to associate that vulnerability for all listed assets. These relations are only suggestions provided to help you perform risk assessment, so you can decide to not select the vulnerability for some assets.
For further information, see:
Certifying only the small company is possible, provided it is legally separated from the bigger company, and you can include in the Information Security Management scope only the elements the small company controls (you do not need to separate everything).
For example, in physical terms, this means that this small company should be located on a floor of its own, not shared with employees of the bigger company.
In terms of policies and procedures, they should be divided in a way that you can control all the elements of your documentation, i.e., even if you need to follow the guidelines of the bigger company, you can do that in your own way. For example, you can implement access control in different ways.
Please note that if you find out that implementing such separation is too complex or costly, then an alternative would be to certify both companies, keeping the bigger company scope as small as possible (e.g., including only the processes that directly interact with the small company).
These materials will help you regarding scope definition:
ISO 19011 is a management system audit standard and can be used to help fulfill ISO 27001 requirements from clause 9.2 – Internal audit (e.g., provides guidelines for audit program planning, auditor selection, audit report documentation, etc.).
This article will provide you a further explanation about internal audit:
These materials will also help you regarding internal audit:
Control A.10.1.2 is covered in our template Policy on the Use of Encryption. You can take a look at its demo at this link: https://advisera.com/27001academy/documentation/policy-on-the-use-of-encryption/
A vulnerability procedure is not mandatory for ISO 27001 and is not a common document adopted by organizations, so there is no template covering the specific clause of the standard related to it (control A.12.6.1 - Management of technical vulnerabilities).
Control A.12.6.1 does not prescribe how many scans are necessary for each classification asset. You should define these based on the results of risk assessment and applicable legal requirements.
This article will provide you with a further explanation about key management:
This article will provide you with a further explanation about vulnerability management:
For detailed processes and more technical reference you should consider NIST Special Publications:
Considering that you will still receive inputs from your technical people, as a starting point, ~200 risks, with ~15% of them to be treated is a good scenario.
Please note that the auditor will be more concerned about the quality of the identified risks (i.e., how relevant they are for the organizations) than their quantity. The single point you need to pay attention to is to not overlook obvious risks, i.e., risks that someone with proper competence in the process or asset would easily identify. To mitigate this risk, you need to include in the risk assessment the personnel involved with the process or asset.
An additional thing to note is that risks for which you already have implemented controls (and you will only accept the risk) also count for your relevant risks.
Regardless of the perspective, the development of metrics follows some general rules:
Considering Product development, some examples are:
For further information, see:
Regardless of the perspective, the development of metrics follows some general rules:
Considering Product development, some examples are:
For further information, see:
You said you don't do outside calibrations. As a testing laboratory however, you need external calibration by competent parties to ensure metrological traceability. For example, the analytical balances.
You asked why the adjustment of instruments is not included in clause 7.4. Note that clause 7.4 deals with handling of test or calibration item (after the sampling step) and is applicable for laboratories handling items to be tested (testing laboratories) or calibrated (calibration laboratories).
It is clause 6.4 which deals with the requirements for equipment, including calibration of any equipment which can influence the validity or results generated (whether a test or calibration result). Here clause 6.4 requirements must be met for all equipment in the process, which in includes for example the components of the ICP, the standard used for the calibration curve and volumetric measuring devices used.
For more information and links to resources, see my reply to the question Equipment qualification at https://community.advisera.com/topic/equipment-qualification/